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NO. 4 FEBRUARY 2020 Introduction 
China’s Guided Memory 
How Historical Events Are Remembered, Glorified, Reinterpreted, and Kept Quiet 
Hanns Günther Hilpert, Frédéric Krumbein and Volker Stanzel 
In 2019, China commemorated several anniversaries of politically significant events in 
its recent history: the May Fourth Movement (100 years), the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China (70 years), the Tibet Uprising (60 years), the beginning of the reform 
and opening policy (40 years), and the massacre on Tiananmen Square (30 years). How 
China officially commemorates these events – or does not – weighs heavily on the 
country’s domestic and foreign policy. The state-constructed interpretations of his-
tory as a claim to power are directed not only at Chinese society, but also at foreign 
partners interacting with China, especially governments and companies. The conceal-
ment of problematic events from the past is alarming, not least because it increases 
the danger that historical mistakes will be repeated. 
 
In its March 2019 strategy paper, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) described the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) as a cooperation 
and negotiating partner, a competitor, and 
a “systemic rival”. The divides between the 
political systems as well as the visions for 
an international order and its values 
illustrate the rivalry of the systems. 
The Communist Party of China (CCP) 
does not limit itself to controlling China’s 
society in the present, but also extends 
its control to the history of the country. 
Among other things, by ideologising the 
memory of historical events, the CCP legiti-
mises its rule. The latter thus appears to 
be the inevitable and consistently positive 
result of a long history. This ideologisation 
of one’s own history makes cooperation 
with China difficult, for China’s partners 
are also supposed to accept how historical 
facts are concealed, repressed, or reinter-
preted – as a result, contemporary politics 
and society thus appear in a favourable 
light for the CCP. China’s leadership expects 
that the official view of history will at least 
be recognised – better still, explicitly con-
firmed – as legitimate. 
Universal values such as democracy and 
human rights, which have played an impor-
tant role in various phases of China’s recent 
history, are deliberately discussed and can 
therefore no longer serve as a basis of 
appeal for exchanges with China – as in 
the Committee on Social, Humanitarian 
and Cultural Affairs of the United Nations 
General Assembly or in the United Nations 
Human Rights Council. The People’s Repub-
lic represents a narrative of human rights 
that places collective social and economic 
human rights in the foreground, but it 
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ignores civil and political human rights as 
well as the claim of human rights to protect 
the individual against the authority of the 
state. In the international human rights dis-
course, for instance in the United Nations, 
the “systemic rival” China confronts the 
West and its version of democracy and 
human rights, not least by resorting to its 
own interpretations of history. 
Historical narratives form the core of 
China’s national identity. Belonging to a 
civilisation that is thousands of years old, 
and which once located itself in the centre 
of the universe, shapes the consciousness 
of its people. It has not been forgotten that 
the path to modernity was marked by dras-
tic political and social disruption, by the 
experience of backwardness to the West 
and Japan, as well as by economic exploi-
tation and military invasion. 
Against this background, powerful his-
torical interpretations have been estab-
lished in China’s politics and society that 
provide orientation and legitimise the 
political rule of the CCP. One of these nar-
ratives is that a unified, strong, nationally 
conscious, and centrally governed China is 
necessary to avoid the chaos, devastation, 
and humiliations of the time before the 
CCP seized power, on the one hand, and to 
protect the country from the hegemonic 
claims of the West, on the other. 
During the course of the reform and 
opening policy since the late 1970s, from 
the party’s point of view, subversive politi-
cal ideas and religious messages poured 
into the country; an ideological vacuum 
formed with the transformation to a mar-
ket economy. In order to legitimise its claim 
to power again, a new paradigm had to 
be created instead of Marxism-Leninism, 
which had failed in practice. Nothing was 
better suited for this than a recourse to 
nation and history. Criticism of the feudal-
ism and imperialism during the imperial 
era, which Mao Tsetung had designed as a 
system foundation, no longer determined 
the discourse and gradually receded. Tra-
ditions that were formerly frowned upon 
and partly forbidden are now honoured as 
the cultural heritage of mankind, and the 
few remaining relics from the imperial era 
have been lavishly restored. The “correct” 
interpretations of history have formed a 
new political focus in schools, universities, 
cadre trainings, and public commemoration 
ceremonies. 
Xi Jinping bases his claim to power and 
the legitimacy of the party on the history 
of China like no other national or party 
leader before him. Xi celebrates himself as 
the guardian of the tradition of good gov-
ernance for the good of the people. Where-
as under Mao, Confucianism was regarded 
as the basic evil par excellence, Xi visited 
Qufu – the birthplace and home of Con-
fucius – and has inserted quotations from 
his teachings into the official rhetoric. 
Knowledge of the events connected with 
anniversaries and their interpretations in 
today’s China shows that German and Euro-
pean politicians face (additional) challenges 
in their cooperation with the country – 
challenges that are often overlooked. 
1919: The May Fourth Movement – 
the Desire for Self-determination 
and Political Reform 
The May Fourth Movement was a national 
student movement that was gradually 
joined by other segments of the population. 
It was primarily directed against the coloni-
sation of China by foreign powers; additional 
demands were focussed on the political, 
social, and economic modernisation of the 
country. It culminated on 4 May 1919, 
when about 3,000 students gathered for 
protests on Tiananmen Square, in Beijing. 
The trigger was the Treaty of Versailles, in 
which China was denied the return of the 
German colonies in Shandong; instead, the 
colonies were given to Japan. The protests 
led to the Chinese government refusing to 
sign the treaty. 
In a speech on 30 April 2019, on the 
occasion of the centenary, Xi linked the 
May Fourth Movement with the history 
of the Communist Party of China and the 
People’s Republic. Three points are char-
acteristic of his interpretation. 
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Firstly, it establishes a historical continu-
ity that presents the May Fourth Movement 
as the predecessor of the CCP, which was 
founded only two years later. Some of the 
later founders of the CCP were indeed 
active in the movement, whereas many 
others had nothing to do with it. 
Secondly, Xi declares nationalism to 
be the core of the May Fourth Movement. 
He also states that the essence of Chinese 
nationalism is love for the nation and the 
party, and that both are the most important 
duties of all Chinese. His own concept of 
the “Chinese dream of the great resurrec-
tion of the Chinese nation” places Xi in 
the tradition of the May Fourth Movement. 
Thirdly, Xi ignores the diversity of the 
movement’s political demands, for example 
for “Mr Democracy” and “Mr Science”. The 
demand for democracy included the reali-
sation of human rights. The aim was to 
modernise Chinese politics and society; 
Western democracy and science were seen 
as instruments for this. 
The main addressees of Xi’s speech are 
those representing the younger generation 
of China, who are serving the nation and 
the party and who should not lack a fight-
ing spirit in the realisation of the Chinese 
dream. What Xi’s interpretation does not 
offer is a history of the May Fourth Move-
ment as one that was critical of the gov-
ernment and demanded political reforms, 
democracy, and modern science along 
Western lines. This alternative narrative of 
the May Fourth Movement was taken up by 
students in 1989. From the perspective of 
many intellectuals of the Chinese cultural 
sphere, the true legacy of May Fourth can 
be found today in Taiwan – the first, and 
so far only, Chinese democracy. 
1949: 1 October – the Identity of 
the People’s Republic 
“China has stood up.” With this famous 
sentence, ascribed to Mao on the occasion 
of the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China on 1 October 1949, the question con-
cerning the identity of the new state arose. 
Had old China risen again – the empire, 
the fictional ideal of a civilisation that 
had been projected into the past again and 
again for more than 2,000 years? Or was it 
the “blank sheet of paper” that Mao wanted 
to fill in a completely new way – a Marxist 
state, liberated from old traditions? 
This question of identity has been an-
swered in different ways in the course of 
the 70-year history of the PRC; the varied 
answers reflect the often violent conflict 
over the orientation of the CCP and the 
country. Mao’s ambition to be the forerun-
ner of the world revolution, even before the 
Soviet Union, initially helped to create an 
identity for the new China. In the PRC, this 
was followed by the smashing of “feudal-
ism” (landowners, bourgeoisie, and indus-
trialists), land reform (with the expropria-
tion of landowners), and the struggle 
against the “counterrevolutionaries” (above 
all the intellectuals). At the same time, it 
supported Maoist revolutionary movements 
wherever they emerged. This China was 
indeed a new one for foreign countries, but 
the majority of states maintained diplomatic 
relations with the old China, that of Chiang 
Kai-shek, which only existed in Taiwan. 
The question of identity again rose to 
the forefront during additional incisive 
events – the famines of the “Great Leap 
Forward” from 1958 onwards, and the Cul-
tural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, which 
concealed an internal power struggle with-
in the party. This question was directed at 
the same time against Confucian and reli-
gious as well as other cultural traditions. 
In 1979 the CCP, under Deng Xiaoping, cat-
egorically turned away from any Marxist-
based social experiments and the ambition 
to lead the world revolution. The party was 
only interested in preserving its power, 
while the citizens – “getting rich is glori-
ous” – were allowed to do business on 
their own. Attempts at political reform, 
such as those undertaken around 1980 and 
with the uprisings of 1989, were nipped 
in the bud. For China’s partners, it was an 
“uneventful” time: The country could be 
dealt with without having to grapple with 
old or new narratives. Meanwhile, the 
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release of private-sector energy led to rapid 
and ever more dynamic economic growth, 
and thus to China’s current position as the 
world’s second-largest economy. 
Eventually Xi, in power since 2012, ended 
the phase of collective leadership established 
by Deng and the biggest domestic political 
crisis since 1989. He has concentrated all 
power in his hands – now as the leader of 
a new world power. It is his goal to realise 
the rise of China and to cement the rule 
of the CCP through the remembrance of 
the country’s more distant history. With 
the combination of “Marxist theory and 
traditional Chinese state leadership”, the 
country is to realise the “Chinese dream”, to 
take again its “rightful place in the world”. 
This makes things more complicated for its 
partners: The CCP implicitly or explicitly 
demands from them, again and again, the 
recognition that China has been forced into 
a “century of shame” (or “humiliation”), 
which must now be compensated for. This 
is one of the central elements of the current 
narrative, because it can be used to justify 
demands for special treatment – a special 
treatment that otherwise has no place in an 
international order, since the latter is based 
on the principle of equal sovereign states. 
“At this moment, the Chinese of all 
ethnic groups and all sons and daughters 
of the Chinese nation at home and abroad 
are proud of it and congratulate our great 
motherland with great joy,” said Xi on 1 
October 2019, on the same balcony from 
which Mao announced the founding of the 
People’s Republic in 1949. With the largest 
military parade in the history of the People’s 
Republic, the CCP demonstrated the strength 
of China to the world – and at the same 
time the strength of the party to its own 
people. The last 70 years thus reveal both a 
history of the rise of a nation and a remark-
ably successful history of maintaining the 
power of a party. The latter is now trying to 
answer the question of its identity between 
old and new China with a comprehensive 
view of history. On the occasion of the an-
niversary of 1 October, the State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China summarised 
it in a simple sentence: “On the basis of the 
5,000 year old culture of China [...] the Chi-
nese people opened the way to socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.” 
The world observes China’s rise with dif-
ferent expectations as well as admiration 
and concern. For China’s partners, the ques-
tion of the country’s identity also plays a 
role, regardless of the historical self-image 
in which it is rooted. They are concerned 
about whether this new world power has 
the experience and means to assume the 
international responsibilities that come 
with political and economic power. 
1959: Tibet – Controversial 
Remembrance 
On 10 March 1959, the “Tibet Uprising” be-
gan in Lhasa and cost an estimated 87,000 
lives, in the course of which the Dalai Lama 
fled into exile to India. The uprising was 
directed against the Chinese presence in 
Tibet and the annexation by the People’s 
Republic in 1951. In memory of the Tibet 
Uprising, Tibetans living in exile worldwide 
celebrate Tibetan Uprising Day on 10 March. 
In contrast, the interpretation of the 
events of March 1959 – a critical moment 
in Tibet’s history, in China, and in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region, which belongs to 
China – could hardly be more contradic-
tory. Since 2009, “Serfs Emancipation Day” 
has been publicly celebrated. It commemo-
rates the expulsion of the Tibetan govern-
ment by Chinese troops on 28 March 
1959 – precisely in reaction to the uprising 
of the locals that began on 10 March. The 
Chinese media consistently interpret the 
complete takeover of government power 
in Lhasa by China as an act of democratic 
reform and emancipation. In official terms, 
Tibet has been a part of China for 700 
years. The exact sequence of events and the 
interpretations thereof are still controver-
sial among Chinese and foreign historians 
today. For China’s official narratives, the 
preservation of the historical sovereignty of 
interpretations is a matter of reason of state. 
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1978/79: Reform and Opening 
Policy – Self-praise for Party and 
Party Leader 
In 1979 something unheard of happened in 
the planned economy of the real socialism 
of the PRC: While the purchase prices for 
agricultural goods were drastically increased, 
the production cooperatives received exten-
sive management autonomy. The latter 
measure – adopted on 18 December 1978 
at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of the CCP – was to 
become the official start of the now 40 
years of extremely successful system trans-
formation, market economy development, 
industrialisation, and modernisation of 
China. As the economy developed, rice 
and grain production increased to such an 
extent that the food shortage in the country 
came to an end. Progress in agriculture led 
to reforms in other sectors. With the intro-
duction of markets, competition, private 
enterprise, and the opening up of direct 
investment, a historically unprecedented 
growth dynamic arose, which eradicated 
poverty and ultimately established China’s 
rise as a world power. 
Since the beginning of 2018, countless 
meetings and conferences have commemo-
rated the ground-breaking session of the 
Third Plenary and celebrated China’s four 
decades of success. Highly acclaimed ex-
hibitions in Beijing and Shenzhen paid 
homage to the fundamental significance 
of the events for the preparation and emer-
gence of “Chinese socialism in the new 
age”. Completely unmentioned in public 
commemorations, however, is the fact that 
the privatisation of agriculture and the 
emergence of farmers’ markets were spon-
taneous movements “from below”, sup-
ported by a rural population that had 
become disillusioned with Maoist indoctri-
nation and impracticable planned-economy 
requirements with decreasing levels of state 
control; they wanted to operate independ-
ently again. Also noticeable is the constant 
emphasis on the unbroken continuity of 
reform and opening up, which continues 
to the present day. Neither the interruption 
of the reform process (1989–1991), which 
followed Tiananmen for a time, nor its par-
tial dismantling, which began around 2012, 
is discussed. The leading role of President Xi 
as a legitimate and responsible administra-
tor of the reform legacy is specifically em-
phasised. 
On the 40th anniversary, on 18 Decem-
ber 2018, Xi, in his speech to the State 
Council, praised the decision of the Third 
Plenum as a turning point in the history of 
the People’s Republic; he placed it in line 
with the founding of the party (CCP, 1 July 
1921) and the state (PRC, 1 October 1949). Xi 
praised the 40 years of successful reform and 
opening policies as proof that the party’s 
strategy and leadership were always correct. 
There is no doubt that China’s historically 
unprecedented economic growth, which 
began in 1979, and the social achievements 
it has made possible deserve recognition. 
The party, and in particular Deng, who was 
responsible for implementing the reforms, 
played an important role in the process. 
On the other hand, it is hardly tenable that 
the party’s centralist claim to control and 
leadership is emphasised in such a way. The 
decentralisation of economic decisions and 
the creation of material incentives for man-
agers and functionaries at the local level 
were characteristic and probably decisive 
for the success of the reform and opening 
process. While production, investment, and 
sales decisions were made autonomously, 
the party secretaries were largely able to 
draw local tax revenues and decisively 
determine the orientation of local economic 
policies. The great achievement of the cen-
tral level of government consisted rather in 
the following: It did not resist the wave of 
privatisation that was spreading, it allowed 
those at the local level the freedom to ex-
periment with reforms, and it promoted 
those reforms nationwide, which produced 
positive results. In addition, it linked the 
promotion of party and state officials to 
the levels of growth achieved and did not 
hamper the reform process with a restric-
tive central reform strategy. 
If the state and the party are once again 
increasingly centralising the economy and 
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even entrepreneurial decisions, it is impor-
tant that the party’s claim to control and 
leadership be seen as a decisive factor in the 
reform process – but this representation 
distorts history. The lack of appreciation 
for the individual contributions of farmers, 
entrepreneurs, and managers to China’s 
economic rise illustrates the fundamental 
contrast with the model of the pluralistic 
Western market economy. 
1989: 4 June on Tiananmen 
Square – Remembering and 
Forgetting 
In 1987, the then-General Secretary of the 
CCP, Hu Yaobang, was forced to resign: In 
Deng’s eyes, he was too liberal. Hu’s death, 
on 15 April 1989, led to nationwide mourn-
ing rallies, which quickly led to a massive 
protest movement mobilising millions of 
people in many cities in China, centring 
on Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Young 
people, workers, and other citizens called 
for political, economic, and social reforms: 
first and foremost the fight against corrup-
tion and for more political participation. 
On 20 May, the leadership imposed mar-
tial law, paving the way for the deployment 
of the military. During the night of 3 June 
into the next morning, soldiers massacred 
Chinese civilians in Beijing, especially in 
access roads to Tiananmen Square, as they 
stood in the path of tanks and soldiers. The 
Chinese Red Cross estimated the number of 
victims at about 2,600 and counted about 
7,000 wounded. There have also been re-
ports of hundreds of victims in other places 
in China, but the exact figures are unknown; 
the official death toll is 187. Thousands 
more demonstrators were imprisoned – 
often for years – in the days and weeks 
that followed. Some fled abroad and keep 
the memory of the bloody suppression alive. 
After 4 June, Deng’s goal was to quickly 
return to normality, that is, economic de-
velopment and solid political control of 
the country. Left-wing opponents of Deng’s 
economic reform policy saw the opportunity 
to blame all policies and the pragmatism of 
“reform and openness” on the neglect of 
Marxist principles, which did not suit them 
in Deng’s politics. Deng himself saw an-
other danger: the internal disruption of 
the party by those who advocated political 
reforms – similar to what happened in 
the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Dealing with the uprising for too long 
seemed to jeopardise a return to Deng’s 
policy of controlled economic reform. Any 
discussion of 4 June was prevented. Even 
the first narrative of a defeated counter-
revolution was quickly silenced. 
Unlike hardly any other event in the last 
30 years, the brutal end of the protests has 
shaped the CCP, external perceptions of the 
People’s Republic, and the handling of dis-
sent and criticism within the party and the 
country. For the Chinese leadership, how-
ever, the silence over the Tiananmen inci-
dents is part of the success of its policy: 
“After the incident, the Chinese govern-
ment followed the line of not discussing 
it, no matter what the West said. China’s 
attitude helped the country to quickly leave 
the crisis behind and to achieve rapid eco-
nomic development.” Since in China all 
reports about the events of 1989 are cen-
sored, the majority of the population is not 
really aware either of the actions of the CCP 
in Tiananmen Square or of its importance 
for the internal development and external 
perceptions of the country. Today, digital 
censorship in China means that only traces 
remain of the memories of witnesses. The 
“Mothers of Tiananmen Square”, who want 
to preserve the memories of their murdered 
children and bring those responsible to jus-
tice, cannot express themselves publicly. In 
April of this year, some students in Sichuan 
province were sentenced to several years 
in jail when they secretly discussed the sup-
pression of the Tiananmen protests. 
Tiananmen still holds a dual symbolism 
today: on the one hand, for an alternative 
democratic development path of China that 
has not (yet) been followed; on the other 
hand, for the numerous human rights vio-
lations, which have been an essential com-
ponent of the authoritarian rule of the CCP 
since the founding of the PRC. In the Xi Jin-
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ping era, people can only express dissent 
individually, and they risk being persecuted 
for it. Any form of collective political mo-
bilisation, whether in the form of organi-
sations or demonstrations, has become 
impossible outside the control of the CCP. 
Therefore, Hong Kong is currently the only 
place in the PRC where it is feared that the 
military could be deployed on a large scale: 
Only there can people still protest freely – 
thanks to its still ongoing special status 
under the designation “One country, two 
systems”. 
Hong Kong has a strong culture of re-
membrance relating to 4 June. Fugitive 
dissidents from the People’s Republic who 
escaped the Chinese army at that time now 
live here. The precarious situation of the 
Special Administrative Zone also keeps the 
memory of Tiananmen alive. By gradually 
reducing Hong Kong’s remaining autono-
my, its population sees the violence of a 
government that was responsible for Tian-
anmen 30 years ago coming closer. This 
explains in part the protest movement, 
which, in the early summer of 2019, ignited 
over a bill to extradite suspected criminals 
to the PRC. The protests continue undimin-
ished to this day. They are primarily directed 
against Beijing’s increasing role in the every-
day lives of residents in Hong Kong. 
China’s way is to enforce forgetting. 
Deng suppressed any commemorations of 
the victims of 4 June unless they were ex-
clusively private. He thus created a space 
for himself to keep the ideologues in check 
while continuing the policy of economic 
reform. In doing so, he set China on the 
path it is today. Many sacrifices have been 
made to the purpose of advancement. The 
memory of 4 June 1989 is one of them. 
History As a Construct 
China’s handling of its anniversaries and 
public commemorations in 2019 shows 
very different, complementary approaches. 
History is hidden, as is the apparent mas-
sacre of 4 June around Tiananmen Square. 
What is less obvious is that the official May 
Fourth commemoration ignores the de-
mands for democratisation and modernisa-
tion in the May Fourth Movement and fails 
to recognise the people’s contributions to 
the success of the Chinese reform process. 
History is instrumentalised, interpreted, 
and reinterpreted. The interpretation that 
the May Fourth Movement was essentially 
nationalist and a predecessor of the CCP is 
very one-sided, if not a misinterpretation 
of the events of 1919. Even the glorification 
of China’s growth successes over the last 
four decades, due to the party’s centralised 
control and leadership, does not do justice 
to the reality of the reform process. Last 
but not least, China’s official view of Tibet 
hardly corresponds to the historical facts. 
Finally, the politicisation of history is 
comprehensive, going beyond the establish-
ment of historical narratives. By resorting to 
China’s imperial past, the recurring ques-
tion about the historical identity of the 
People’s Republic is today answered in a 
nationalistic way. The system of Chinese 
socialism and the current political rise of 
the country are in harmony with China’s 
civilisation and history, which provides self-
assurance internally while conveying a 
powerful propaganda message externally. 
History becomes an instrument of power 
and foreign policy. 
China’s historical narrative thus has a 
direct impact on German and European 
foreign policy. The number of issues that 
are considered to be sensitive for the Chi-
nese government is increasing; control over 
historiography is an example of this. Bei-
jing expects not only its own population 
but also its foreign partners to follow the 
Chinese narratives, with all of the ramifi-
cations and evaluations, be it the “5,000 
years” of Chinese history, the “always 
peaceful” character of China, or the PRC’s 
ownership claims in the South China Sea. 
Companies operating in China may be 
penalised for using a philosophical quote 
from the Dalai Lama in their advertising; 
academics working in the country must 
adapt. If China is now systematically ignor-
ing the struggles over democracy and human 
rights that have taken place in the course of 
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its history, it will be even more difficult to 
reach agreement with its partners. 
German and European politicians must 
prepare themselves for the fact that a China 
that no longer discusses its own historical 
mistakes, such as the massive human rights 
violations of the Mao era and the Tianan-
men massacre, will possibly make the same 
mistakes again – but now with the asser-
tiveness of a world power. Germany should 
emphasise the diversity of Chinese history 
and also refer to Chinese models when 
referring to democracy and human rights, 
such as the May Fourth Movement and the 
1989 Democracy Movement. Germany 
should also point not only to current but 
also historical human rights violations, 
which often have the same origins as the 
Communist Party’s absolute claim to power. 
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